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Essay
Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of
Brady v. Maryland
Scott E. Sundby*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the constitutional world of criminal procedure, a handful of Warren Court
cases have taken on superhero status. Gideon,' Miranda,2 Mapp,3 Duncan,4 and
Katz5 are all cases in which the Court not only announced an important
procedural right, but did so in ringing moral terms that forever associated the
right with the case. These opinions possess special rhetorical power because they
are expressly founded upon fundamental values like equality, human dignity,
morality of government, protection of the oppressed, and privacy. Indeed, one
suspects that the fervor with which decisions like Miranda and Mapp often are
defended arises in part because of the sense that larger values and judgments are
at stake.
This essay focuses on another criminal procedure superhero from the Warren
Court, the case of Brady v. Maryland.6 Brady is often heralded as the Supreme
Court case that granted the criminally accused a constitutional right to discovery.
Like the other members of the pantheon, the Brady Court announced its holding
with a strong tone of moral authority.
We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. The principle ... is not
punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an
unfair trial to the accused. Society wins not only when the guilty are
convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration
of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly. An inscription on
* Sydney and Frances Lewis Professor of Law, Washington & Lee School of Law. This essay is based
on a lecture given at the University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law as part of the McGeorge School of
Law's Distinguished Speaker Series. I am grateful to Professors John Barrett, Frank Bowman, Darryl Brown,
Joshua Dressier, William Geimer, Roger Groot, Dan Richman, Richard Seamon, Howard Srebnick, and George
Thomas for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.
I. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
4. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
5. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
6. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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the walls of the Department of Justice states the proposition candidly for
the federal domain: "The United States wins its point whenever justice is
done its citizens in the courts."7
From this Olympian perspective, Brady was the constitutional superhero that not
only would ensure that a criminal defendant had access to all important
exculpatory evidence before facing the State at trial, but also embodied the
prosecutor's ethical duty to pursue "justice" and not simply victory in the
courtroom.
Certainly when I first started teaching Brady, I taught it from this heroic
viewpoint. To the extent that the criminal defense bar and legal commentators
complained that exculpatory material was not forthcoming prior to trial, I
attributed such failures not to Brady, but to prosecutors failing to live up to their
constitutional duties. Lately, however, I have begun to wonder whether, like my
childhood heroes, Brady is not the constitutional superhero that I once thought.8
This essay examines the failed promise of Brady and argues that while Brady
undoubtedly sets forth an important constitutional right, its significance lies primarily
outside the realm of pre-trial discovery. In other words, if anyone else has shared
the belief that Brady sets forth an important constitutional right for discovering
exculpatory evidence prior to trial, it is time that we re-examine Brady and
realize that its superhero powers are far more limited. In fact, although it sounds
provocatively odd to state, I will suggest that under the Court's current Brady
doctrine, an ethical prosecutor arguably should never be in the position of
turning over Brady material prior to trial.
Before that last statement triggers an avalanche of outraged comments, let
me make clear that this essay is not an apologia for prosecutors who fail to turn
over important discovery material to the defense. Rather, the essay's purpose is
to highlight the point that if academia, the courts, and lawyers are pointing to
Brady as a means of ensuring that defendants are receiving "favorable" evidence
prior to trial, they are largely pointing to a mirage.9 While part of the difficulty
may be that some prosecutors are not fulfilling their duties under Brady, this
essay suggests that a significant part of the problem also lies with the Supreme
Court's decisions: the Court's development of Brady's holding destined the
doctrine to become less of a pre-trial discovery right and more of a post-trial
remedy for prosecutorial and law enforcement misconduct.
7. Id. at 87.
8. Such a reassessment perhaps should not be limited to Brady. Commentators increasingly are calling
into question the continued viability of the Supreme Court's landmark decisions in the criminal procedure area.
See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107
YALE L.J. I (1997).
9. The mirage metaphor has occurred to at least one other commentator writing about Brady. See M.
Shawn Matlock, The Mirage of Brady in Wvoting: How Far Will the Woming Supreme Court Allow a Prosecutor to
Go?, 35 LAND & WATER L. REV. 609 (1999).
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Now, it may be that most lawyers, judges, and legal observers never fell
under Brady's constitutional spell and did not believe that the case possessed
significant discovery powers. To the extent that Brady's mystique has transfixed
others, however, the danger exists that a Brady mirage is obscuring a clear-eyed
evaluation of whether current discovery standards are effectively granting
defendants access to exculpatory evidence. In other words, if we do not expressly
recognize Brady's limitations as a discovery doctrine, we may erroneously be
tempted to dismiss or downplay complaints that discovery rules are inadequate
because of a misguided belief that Brady ultimately will ensure that nothing
important slips through. This essay's bottom-line message, therefore, is that if
Brady provides a sense of security that defendants are constitutionally entitled to
broad discovery, that sense of security is a false one. If there is legitimacy to the
arguments that defendants should receive broad discovery (and I do not attempt
to resolve that debate in this essay), then either Brady must be dramatically
altered or the criminal justice system must turn to other avenues to accomplish
that goal, avenues such as statutory discovery rights and the rules of criminal
procedure.
II. THE EVOLVING MATERIALITY STANDARD AND
THE FALLEN SUPERHERO
In Brady, the Court announced "that the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith
or bad faith of the prosecution."'0 In the ensuing decades, the Court has built
upon this standard and extended Brady's reach to include impeachment
evidence," evidence that the defendant has not specifically requested," and
evidence that is in the control of government actors other than the prosecutor. 3
Examined in the light of these cases, Brady appears to be an expanding doctrine
into which the Court has injected flexibility to reflect the realities of criminal
prosecutions.
As Brady's scope has been expanding to cover a broader range of
government behavior and evidence, however, the Court simultaneously has been
contracting the Brady right on another front, that of materiality. The Court's
decisions defining what constitutes "material" evidence are particularly important
because they have changed the very nature of how Brady operates in practice.
Indeed, it is the Court's materiality decisions that essentially have robbed Brady
of any pre-trial superhero powers and transformed the doctrine from a pre-trial
discovery right into a post-trial remedy for government misconduct. Thus, while
10. 373 U.S. at 87.
11. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985).
12. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976).
13. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995).
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the breadth of Brady's coverage may have expanded to cover matters like impeachment
evidence, that expansion is somewhat illusory because the compass of impeachment
evidence that actually would qualify as material under Brady is now so circumscribed.
To understand the role of materiality in shaping Brady, it is helpful to briefly
retrace how the Court arrived at the current definition of what constitutes material
Brady evidence. Recall the basic standard that Brady announced: "[T]he
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.' 4 If
one goes back and reads Brady, it is a little surprising to find that while the
adjective "material" is used to describe the evidence which is covered by the new
right, no definition of what constitutes "material" is given.
Indeed, one perfectly plausible reading of "material" within the context of the
opinion is that it means "relevant," such that the prosecution would be obligated to
turn over all relevant favorable evidence. 5 At one point in his Brady opinion, for
instance, Justice Douglas stated the obligation in words that resonate with the
idea of relevance: "A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an
accused which, if made available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the
penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily on the defendant."' 6 Moreover,
without any signal of disapproval, the Brady majority opinion quoted the state
court's rationale for reversing Brady's death sentence, a rationale that suggests a
relatively low materiality standard for reversal:
There is considerable doubt as to how much good [the co-defendant's]
undisclosed confession would have done Brady if it had been before the
jury. It clearly implicated Brady as being the one who wanted to strangle
the victim, Brooks. [The co-defendant], according to this statement, also
favored killing him, but he wanted to do it by shooting. We cannot put
ourselves in the place of the jury and assume what their views would
have been as to whether it did or did not matter whether it was Brady's
hands or [the co-defendant's] hands that twisted the shirt about the
victim's neck .... It would be 'too dogmatic' for us to say that the jury
would not have attached any significance to this evidence in considering
the punishment of the defendant Brady.
14. 373 U.S. at 87.
15. Justice Marshall made a similar observation in his dissent in Bagley, 473 U.S. at 703 n.5 (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (pointing to case citations within the Brady opinion that "provide strong evidence that Brady
might have used the word Imaterial] in its evidentiary sense, to mean, essentially, germane to the points at
issue."). See also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 298 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Brady itself did not
explain what it meant by 'material' (perhaps assuming the term would be given its usual meaning in the law of
evidence .... )"); United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[Tjhe [Brady] Court appears to be
using the word 'material' in its evidentiary sense, i.e., evidence that has some probative tendency to preclude a
finding of guilt or lesser punishment, cf Fed. R. Evid. 401.").
16. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88 (emphasis added).
646
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 33
Not without some doubt, we conclude that the withholding of this particular
confession of [the co-defendant] was prejudicial to the defendant Brady."
Finally, while the Court agreed with the state court that Brady was entitled
only to a new sentencing hearing and not to a new guilt trial, its reasoning was
not that the co-defendant's confession would have had no material effect on the
jury's guilty verdict, but that the confession would have been inadmissible at the
guilt trial under state law.'" The Court's holding, therefore, while not expressly
embracing a relevance standard, was consistent with the idea that the exculpatory
evidence simply had to be relevant (and admissible) to be material.
If the Brady doctrine had eventually grown into this interpretation, then the
doctrine very well may have taken on the heroic qualities that I once attributed to
it. And there was a voice on the Supreme Court arguing for such a vision. Justice
Marshall maintained that if Brady was to fulfill its due process aspirations of
ensuring that a defendant had a fair chance of meeting the State's allegations,
then the State must be required to turn over "all information ... that might
reasonably be considered favorable to the defendant's case."' 9 This view, as we
will see, would likely have turned Brady into a far more vibrant channel of pre-
trial discovery.
Instead, the Court ultimately rejected the heroic view through a series of
decisions that gradually defined Brady's materiality requirement with increasing
strictness. As noted before, this gradual contraction of Brady's reach was often
partially masked because it took place in cases where the Court was at the same
time extending Brady's applicability to new fact situations. With the benefit of
hindsight, we can trace how Brady became more of a post-trial remedy than a
pre-trial discovery right.
The process began with United States v. Agurs,20 decided thirteen years after
Brady. The case reflects precisely the phenomenon of the Court expanding
Brady's reach to new situations, while at the same time narrowly circumscribing
through the materiality requirement the actual evidence which becomes subject to
discovery. In Agurs, the Court for the first time expressly held that Brady extended
to exculpatory evidence even if the defendant had not specifically requested the
evidence. 2' However, bringing such evidence within Brady's coverage also necessarily
raised a question that brought materiality to the fore: if no defense request is
necessary to trigger Brady, how is a prosecutor in reviewing her file to know
17. Id. at 88 (emphasis omitted). While the Court's use of the state court's language is consistent with a
relevance-based definition of materiality, fairness requires acknowledgment that the Court was not using the
quotation to explain materiality. Rather, it was using the quotation as a prelude to explaining why even if the
evidence might be material under Maryland's law, the confession would have been inadmissible at the guilt
trial, so Brady was entitled only to a new sentencing hearing.
18. Id. at 90.
19. Bag/ey, 473 U.S. at 695-96 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
20. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
21. Id. at 97.
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what evidence she must turn over to avoid constitutional sanctions? In Agurs, the
Supreme Court understood the lower court's opinion as essentially holding that
prosecutors must turn over any evidence that "might affect the jury's verdict"-a
standard that the Court believed for all practical purposes would mean that "the
only way a prosecutor could discharge his constitutional duty would be to allow
complete discovery of his files as a matter of routine practice. 22
While the Court encouraged "prudent prosecutor[s to] resolve doubtful questions
in favor of disclosure, ' 23 it also firmly clarified that Brady disclosure was not a
discovery right as such,24 but an obligation that dealt "with the defendant's right
to a fair trial mandated by the Due Process Clause."2  While tacitly
acknowledging that the original Brady opinion was ambiguous in its intended use
of the word "material, 26 the Court disavowed the view that would have equated
"material" with "relevant." The Court stated that "the prosecutor will not have
violated his constitutional duty of disclosure unless his omission is of sufficient
significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial."27 The
opinion later made clear that "of sufficient significance" means that "the omitted
evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist. '28
In crafting its materiality standard, the Agurs majority was attempting to
ensure that prosecutors would not run afoul of Brady simply because they did not
turn over all of the government's evidence to the defendant. This concern was
highlighted because Agurs was formally extending Brady to information about
which the prosecutor did not have "notice" from the defendant that it might be
important. By contrast, in prior Brady cases, the prosecutor had been on notice
because the defendant had specifically requested the information, 29 or because the
prosecutor realized or should have known that perjured testimony was being
presented at trial-a situation that involved such "fundamental unfairness" that
any prosecutor would be aware of the need to take corrective action. Where a
22. Id. at 108-09.
23. Id. at 108.
24. Id. at 107 ("We are not considering the scope of discovery authorized by the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, or the wisdom of amending those Rules to enlarge the defendant's discovery rights.").
25. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107.
26. In Agurs, Justice Stevens seemed to acknowledge the potential ambiguity when he stated: "A fair
analysis of the holding in Brady indicates that implicit in the requirement of materiality is a concern that the
suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial." Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 108.
28. Id. at 112. The Court also stated, however, that the defendant need not demonstrate that the
suppressed evidence "probably would have resulted in acquittal," the standard for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence. Id. at I 1. The Court reasoned that not requiring this extra step provided recognition of the
"special significance" that the evidence had been in the government's possession and was not found in a
"neutral source." Id. Justice Marshall in his dissent could not see the difference, since "Islurely if a judge is able
to say that evidence actually creates a reasonable doubt as to guilt in his mind (the Court's standard), he would
also conclude that the evidence 'probably would have resulted in acquittal."' Id. at 116 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
29. Brady's attorney specifically asked to see any statements by the co-defendant.
30. The perjury line of cases significantly predates the Brady decision. See, e.g., Mooney v. Holohan,
294 U.S. 103 (1935). However, it is now characterized as a type of Brady violation. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103.
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specific request has not been made, however, the majority reasoned that the
notice to the prosecutor of the need to turn information over must come from the
nature of the exculpatory evidence itself: "[I]f the evidence is so clearly
supportive of a claim of innocence that it gives the prosecution notice of a duty to
produce, that duty should equally arise even if no request is made."3
While the Agurs Court's concern over "notice" led it to adopt a stringent
definition of materiality for cases where the defendant had made no request or
only a general request, it indicated that a more lenient standard would apply to
specific request cases because "[w]hen the prosecutor receives a specific and
relevant request, the failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, excusable."32
In United States v. Bagley,33 however, the Court moved even further in characterizing
Brady's materiality standard as merely one aspect of the Court's general "fair
trial" right rather than treating it as a constitutional obligation with a distinct
lineage. Relying on opinions dealing with ineffective assistance of counsel and
unavailable defense witnesses, 34 the Bagley Court announced that a one-size-fits-
all materiality standard would now govern Brady cases, regardless of whether the
defendant had made a specific request, a general request, or no request at all:
"The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome."35 In the later case of Kyles v. Whitley, 6 the Court
placed a further functional gloss on the meaning of "reasonable probability" by
stating that the question is whether "the favorable evidence could reasonably be
taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence
in the verdict.,
37
The extent of Bagley's movement towards a "result-focused" standard 31 for
determining whether Brady had been violated was driven home in Strickler v.
Greene. 9 While the Court did not alter the test for materiality, the majority
opinion seemed aware that a perception had arisen that Brady compelled a
prosecutor to turn over important exculpatory evidence even if the evidence
31. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107.
32. Id. at 106.
33. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
34. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bemal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982) (due process is violated when
testimony is made unavailable through government deportation of a defense witness); Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984) (ineffective assistance of counsel requires reversal when outcome reliability is undermined).
Strickland, in turn, relied upon Agurs in defining its reversal standard. Id. at 694.
35. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. The Bagley majority apparently envisioned that a lower standard of
materiality would continue to apply to the prosecution's use of perjured testimony because of its seriousness as
"a corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process." Id. at 680 (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104). In
the perjured testimony category, the evidence is "considered material unless failure to disclose it would be
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
36. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
37. Id. at 435.
38. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 714 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
39. 527 U.S. 263 (1999).
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would not by itself undermine the verdict. The Court thus went out of its way to
distinguish "so-called Brady violations" from "true Brady violation[s]."
[T]he term "Brady violation" is sometimes used to refer to any breach of
the broad obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence-that is, to any
suppression of so-called "Brady material"-although, strictly speaking,
there is never a real "Brady violation" unless the nondisclosure was so
serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence
would have produced a different verdict. There are three components of a
true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the
accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching;
that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or
inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.40
Consequently, although the government had not disclosed powerful impeachment
• 41
evidence in Strickler, the majority concluded that a Brady violation had not
occurred because the "petitioner ha[d] not shown that there [was] a reasonable
probability that his conviction or sentence would have been different had these
materials been disclosed. 42
111. THE MATERIALITY STANDARD MEETS THE ETHICAL PROSECUTOR
While the Court's emphasis in Strickler on clarifying what constitutes "true"
Brady material did not change the law, it does effectively highlight a largely
unexplored tension between Brady and the prosecutor's ethical duties. The
Court's clarification between "true" Brady and "so-called" Brady material seems
to be aimed at guarding against "ethical creep"-the temptation to use ethical
norms to define the constitutional standard regulating discovery. In other words,
the Court seems to be saying that a distinction must be maintained between what
is ethically desirable as prosecutorial discovery and what is constitutionally
required.
This position does have a bit of an odd feel to it given that the Brady opinion
itself reminded prosecutors in thunderous tones that their duty is "not to achieve
victory but to establish justice. 43 Since Brady, however, the Court has
40. Id. at 281-82 (footnote omitted).
41. The Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's cursory characterization of the disputed impeachment evidence as
"providlingi little or no help." Id. at 289. The majority, however, found that, at most, the impeachment evidence
created a "reasonable possibility" of a different result rather than the requisite "reasonable probability." Id. at
290-91.
42. Id. at 296. The dissent believed that the suppressed impeachment evidence created a reasonable
probability that a different sentencing verdict, a life rather than a death sentence, would have resulted. Justice
Souter also proposed restating the materiality standard in terms of a "significant possibility" rather than "reasonable
probability," because of his belief that the "tenn 'probability' raises an unjustifiable risk of misleading courts into
treating it as akin to the more demanding standard, 'more likely than not."' Id. at 298 (Souter, J., concurring and
dissenting).
43. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 n.2.
650
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 33
consistently cautioned that Brady's discovery obligation does not stretch as far as
a prosecutor's ethical duty. Recall that the Agurs Court emphasized that it was
not going to allow Brady to be used as a means of smuggling a defacto open-file
policy into the Constitution.44 More pointedly, in Kyles, the Court expressly
acknowledged that, "the rule in Bagley (and, hence, in Brady) requires less of the
prosecution than the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, which call generally
for prosecutorial disclosures of any evidence tending to exculpate or mitigate.,
45
This refusal to extend Brady's constitutional obligation as far as the prosecutor's
ethical duties is not unusual, of course, as the Court frequently admonishes that
constitutional duties are to be interpreted independently of what might constitute
wise or desirable public policy.46
Yet, while the untying of the constitutional standard from underlying ethical
norms is not particularly remarkable, it is still important to ask what Brady means
for the ethical prosecutor. This is especially true because Brady, despite the
Court's later attempts at severance, remains intimately associated in both legal
and public minds with notions of prosecutorial ethics. And if we undertake this
inquiry of what Brady asks of the ethical prosecutor, the answer is quite
interesting and perhaps a bit startling.
Let us conduct the inquiry by placing our prosecutor in a pre-trial situation
where she receives a piece of evidence that she must evaluate under the Court's
materiality standard. For the Brady obligation to be triggered, she would have to
hold the evidence in her hand and think:
This piece of evidence is so exculpatory in nature that it actually
undermines my belief that a guilty verdict would be worthy of confidence.
Under Brady, therefore, I need to turn this evidence over to the defense.
Then, once I turn the evidence over and satisfy my constitutional
obligation, I can resume my zealous efforts to obtain a guilty verdict that
I have just concluded will not be worthy of confidence.
Viewed through this scenario, the Court has set Brady's materiality threshold
at a point where we should be raising an ethical eyebrow at the prosecutor who
actually declares that she has "true" Brady material that she must turn over to the
defense. If the Court's materiality standard is taken literally, far from indicating
that we are dealing with an ethical prosecutor, a prosecutor turning over Brady
44. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 109.
45. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 (citing ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION
AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 3-3.11 (a) (3d ed. 1993); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (1984)).
46. See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 ("Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar
Association standards and the like ... are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides.");
United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 320-21 (1973) ("The primary safeguard against abuses of [photo arrays] is
the ethical responsibility of the prosecutor .... We are not persuaded that the risks inherent.., are so pernicious
that an extraordinary system of safeguards is required."); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346 n. 10 (1980)
(although the Sixth Amendment does not require state trial judges to inquire about conflicts-of-interest where
multiple representation exists, "[a]s our promulgation of Rule 44(c) [of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure]
suggests, we view such an exercise of the supervisory power as a desirable practice,").
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evidence should make us pause and wonder: why is she still pursuing prosecution
after acknowledging that evidence exists creating a reasonable probability that an
innocent defendant may be convicted? Is not the prosecutor who turns over
Brady evidence prior to trial, therefore, identifying herself as precisely the type
of prosecutor condemned by the Brady Court as someone more interested in
"achiev[ing] victory" than "establish[ing] justice?"
It is in this sense that I suggested at the essay's beginning that if the Court is
serious about its materiality standard for Brady, then arguably an ethical prosecutor
should never have Brady material to turn over to the defense. Instead, a conscientious
prosecutor faced with "true" Brady evidence-material so exculpatory that it
would make her question the reliability of a guilty verdict-should move for
dismissal of the charges that no longer are supported by the evidence.
Several possible responses come to mind. First, the ABA standards ethically
allow a prosecutor to proceed with a prosecution supported only by probable
cause. 47 Under these standards, a prosecutor could find "true" Brady material and
still proceed, confident that the case has not fallen below the probable cause
standard needed for indictment. Without attempting to indict the ABA rule
itself,4' I would suggest that even a believer in the ABA probable cause threshold
would have serious ethical pangs as she zealously asked a jury to convict
someone about whom she entertained serious doubts as to his or her guilt. More
subjectively, I would argue that most prosecutors generally do wish to pursue
"justice" rather than "victory," and "justice" would not include convicting an
individual about whom they harbor serious doubts as to guilt. Consistent with
this view, prosecutorial guidelines, such as the U.S. Attorneys' Manual, call for
the prosecutor to evaluate the strength of the evidence as measured against the
49
reasonable doubt standard and not that of probable cause.
Moreover, even if one takes a less charitable view of prosecutorial motives and
sees prosecutors as primarily motivated by the desire for victory, a prosecutor
47. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION 3-3.9(a) (3d ed. 1993) ("A
prosecutor should not institute, or cause to be instituted, or to permit the continued pendency of criminal
charges when the prosecutor knows that the charges are not supported by probable cause.").
48. Interestingly, after setting out the probable cause standard, the ABA standard appears to back away
from using probable cause to justify prosecution, stating that "Ja] prosecutor should not institute, cause to be
instituted, or permit the continued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence
to support a conviction." Id. The ABA standards also provide that "[a] prosecutor should not be compelled by
his or her supervisor to prosecute a case in which he or she has a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the
accused." Id. 3-3.9(c).
49. The U.S. Attorneys' Manual recognizes that "[tjhe probable cause standard is... a threshold
consideration only. Merely because this requirement can be met in a given case does not automatically warrant
prosecution; further investigation may be warranted, and the prosecutor should still take into account all
relevant considerations, including those described in the following provisions." U.S. ATI'YS' MANUAL 9-27.200
cmt. (U.S. Dep't of Justice 2002). The Manual proceeds to state that "both as a matter of fundamental fairness
and in the interest of the efficient administration of justice, no prosecution should be initiated against any person
unless the government believes that the person probably will be found guilty by an unbiased trier of fact." Id.
9-27.220 cmt.; see also STANDARDS FOR NAT'L PROSECUTION (Nat'l Dist. Attys' Ass'n., 2d ed. 1991) (amended
1999) ("The prosecutor shall file only those charges which he believes can reasonably be substantiated by admissible
evidence at trial.").
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faced with "true" Brady evidence in our scenario would be likely to seek dismissal
of the charges. Prosecutors evaluating a case are acutely aware that eventually the
case must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt,50 and while it may be possible to
indict a ham sandwich before a grand jury with a probable cause standard,
convicting a defendant on evidence beyond a reasonable doubt before a petit jury
is a far more daunting task. As every prosecutor knows, it is a rare case that does
not develop unanticipated weaknesses or holes (like the key witness who
suddenly becomes inarticulate on the witness stand). To proceed to trial knowing
that the defense is already armed with powerful exculpatory evidence, therefore,
would seem to be inviting an adverse verdict. And while prosecutors may
foremost be "ministers of justice,"'" their reputation (or lack thereof) as
successful trial attorneys is likely to have an impact on professional advancement
within the prosecutor's office or on the later availability of opportunities in the
private sector.
There is, however, another scenario which theoretically would allow the
prosecutor to adhere to an ethical standard that requires her to believe that the
defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt while still turning over "true"
Brady material. This prosecutor could look at evidence and have the following
internal monologue:
I can see how a trier of fact might take this piece of evidence in such a
way as to disbelieve my key witness, which would likely then lead them to
find a reasonable doubt. Now, I certainly believe the witness, and I think
that I can convince the jury that he is telling the truth because of the
evidence corroborating his testimony. Still, I could see how if the jury did
not hear this evidence, a court later could say that because the jury
didn't have a chance to consider the impeaching evidence, the reliability
of the guilty verdict is undermined. Therefore, this is true Brady material
and 1 must turn it over.
This prosecutor, then, would appear to satisfy both the ethical mandate of
pursuing only cases in which she believes in the defendant's guilt while also
finding "true" Brady material to disclose.
If this is the only scenario that allows us to find ethical prosecutors who will
be turning over "true" Brady material prior to trial, however, we have identified a
narrow band of cases indeed. First, the thought process posits a prosecutor who is
50. Cf U.S. ATrYS' MANUAL 9-27.300 cmt.
At the outset, the attorney for the government should bear in mind that at trial he/she will have
to produce admissible evidence sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction or else the
government will suffer a dismissal. For this reason, he/she should not include in an
information or recommend in an indictment charges that he/she cannot reasonably expect to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt by legally sufficient evidence at trial.
Id.
51. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCI" R. 3.8 cmt. (2002); see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S.
78, 88 (1935).
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capable of a Zen-like state of harmonizing objective and subjective beliefs,
simultaneously recognizing that the evidence objectively creates a reasonable
probability that a reasonable jury will entertain a reasonable doubt while still
subjectively believing that continued prosecution is warranted. Justice Marshall,
in particular, believed that asking prosecutors to make such a "dual" assessment
was to ignore "the realit[ies] of criminal practice:""
At the trial level, the duty of the state to effectuate Brady devolves
into the duty of the prosecutor; the dual role that the prosecutor must
play poses a serious obstacle to implementing Brady. The prosecutor is
by trade, if not necessity, a zealous advocate. He is a trained attorney
who must aggressively seek convictions in court on behalf of a
victimized public. At the same time, as a representative of the state, he
must place foremost in his hierarchy of interests the determination of
truth. Thus, for purposes of Brady, the prosecutor must abandon his role
as an advocate and pore through his files, as objectively as possible, to
identify the material that could undermine his case. Given this obviously
unharmonious role, it is not surprising that these advocates oftentimes
overlook or downplay potentially favorable evidence, often in cases in
which there is no doubt that the failure to disclose was a result of
absolute good faith....
The prosecutor surely greets the moment at which he must turn over
Brady material with little enthusiasm. In perusing his files, he must make
the often difficult decision as to whether evidence is favorable, and must
decide on which side to err when faced with doubt. In his role as
advocate, the answers are clear. In his role as representative of the state,
the answers should be equally clear, and often to the contrary. Evidence
that is of doubtful worth in the eyes of the prosecutor could be of
inestimable value to the defense, and might make the difference to the
trier of fact.53
52. Justice Marshall's emphasis on "the realities of criminal practice" is consistent with his general
emphasis on the necessity of recognizing that the Court's holdings would be implemented in the real world:
"His legal positions.... seem to have been rooted, not in any overarching ideology of limited government, but
in an intense awareness, based upon long experience, that those who wield the authority of the state are but
human actors." Bruce A. Green & Daniel Richman, Of Laws and Men: An Essay on Justice Marshall's View of
Criminal Procedure, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 369, 370 (1994). For a penetrating look at the realities of how federal
prosecutors exercise their discretion, especially in relation to interacting with agents, see Daniel Richman,
Prosecutors and Their Agents-Agents and Their Prosecutors (forthcoming) (on file with the author).
53. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 696-98 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall illustrated his argument with a
"telling example, offered by Judge Newman when he was a United States Attorney."
I recently had occasion to discuss [Bradyl at a PLI Conference in New York City before a
large group of State prosecutors .... I put to them this case: You are prosecuting a bank
robbery. You have talked to two or three of the tellers and one or two of the customers at the
time of the robbery. They have all taken a look at your defendant in a line-up, and they have
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Justice Marshall's view of the "realities of criminal practice" would appear to
have a firm grounding in research on "cognitive conservatism," research which
consistently shows that individuals are resistant to changing an existing view of
facts and, consequently, try to incorporate new information in a way that
confirms the pre-existing view.-4 If Justice Marshall's view is correct, it may well
be that most prosecutors who actually went through the thought process depicted
in the monologue bubble would, in their own minds, ultimately conclude that the
impeaching evidence did not generate a realistic probability of reasonable doubt.
If the prosecutor chose to disclose the evidence, then, she would be doing so to
"to be on the safe side," rather than out of a belief that disclosure was
constitutionally required. Because of his concerns that prosecutors would have
difficulty engaging in such a dichotomous thought process, Justice Marshall
advocated a materiality standard that did not require the prosecutor to assess the
likelihood that the evidence would undermine a guilty verdict.
But even if Justice Marshall underestimated most prosecutors' abilities to
overcome the cognitive dissonance inherent in the Bagley standard, the scenario
underscores how high the materiality bar has been placed. To both trigger pre-
trial Brady disclosure and remain ethical, the prosecutor simultaneously must
believe that she possesses exculpatory evidence that "could reasonably be taken
to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in [a
guilty] verdict,"55 and that continued prosecution is still warranted despite the
strength of the exculpatory evidence. Such a case is likely to be a rare one, and,
of course, if Justice Marshall's psychoanalysis of prosecutors is correct, they will
also need to possess the self-enlightenment necessary to avoid rationalizing (not
necessarily out of conscious bad faith) that the evidence really is not so
exculpatory as to make it probable that a jury would find a reasonable doubt.
Thus, while we can find a scenario where prior to trial a prosecutor can be
both ethical and disclose "true" Brady evidence, the scenario is a narrow one.
And even in that situation, discovery of evidence so exculpatory that its
"suppression... [would] portend such an effect on a trial's outcome as to destroy
said. "This is the man." In the course of your investigation you also have found another
customer who was in the bank that day, who viewed the suspect, and came back and said,
"This is not the man."
The question I put to these prosecutors was, do you believe you should disclose to the defense
the name of the witness who, when he viewed the suspect, said "that is not the man"? In a
room of prosecutors not quite as large as this group but almost as large, only two hands went
up. There were only two prosecutors in that group who felt they should disclose or would
disclose that information. Yet I was putting to them what I thought was the easiest case-the
clearest case for disclosure of exculpatory information! Id. at 697 (citing J. Newman, A Panel
Discussion before the Judicial Conference of the Second Judicial Circuit (Sept. 8, 1967),
reprinted in Discovery in Criminal Cases, 44 F.R.D. 481, 500-01 (1968)).
54. See Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry Into Lawyers' Responsibility
for Clients' Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 100-01 (1993) (examining how cognitive conservatism can impede a
lawyer's ability to recognize client fraud).
55. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 419.
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confidence in its result, 5 6 may start to bring the prosecutor uncomfortably close
to pursuing a prosecution where she entertains significant doubts as to the
defendant's guilt. Most importantly, what becomes evident is that the Brady
materiality standard when applied in the pre-trial discovery context is in serious
tension with Brady's very idea of prosecutors pursuing "justice" rather than
"victory:" the closer we come to finding that certain evidence is sufficiently
exculpatory under Brady that it must be turned over, the closer we come to
finding that the next ethical step is not disclosure, but dismissal of the charges. If
the standard for materiality is this high, then it should be of little wonder-and
we in fact should be pleased-that Brady triggers relatively little pre-trial
discovery.
At this point, let me confess to having engaged in a bit of rhetorical
gamesmanship. I am not seriously suggesting that prosecutors who turn over
evidence under the auspices of Brady should be investigated by the state ethics
commissions. Quite to the contrary, a prosecutor turning over exculpatory
evidence is likely to feel that she should be heralded for acting in a highly ethical
manner. I would suggest, however, that the vast majority of the material turned
over in these situations is what the Strickler Court labeled "so-called" Brady
material: that is, evidence which the prosecutor believes could be seen as
exculpatory and therefore discloses the evidence to be on the safe side or out of
ethical considerations (or both), bu, which the prosecutor does not actually
believe could objectively undermine confidence in a guilty verdict if not
revealed.57 In turning over such evidence, then, the prosecutor is doing so as a
matter of judgment and ethical duty rather than out of a constitutional obligation.
Indeed, despite its constitutional stinginess in defining materiality, the Court
has in various ways actively encouraged the turning over of "so-called" Brady
evidence. For although the Court has carefully distinguished between "true" and
"so-called" Brady evidence for remedial purposes, it also has been cognizant of
the difficulties that it created by crafting a pre-trial disclosure obligation based
on a post-trial conclusion that the evidence would have created a reasonable
56. Id. at 439.
57. As a small sliver of anecdotal evidence, during the year that I served as a Special Assistant United
States Attorney, I came across what the Strickler Court would now label "true" Brady evidence on only two
occasions (this hindsight assessment assumes, of course, that I am accurately overcoming any cognitive
dissonance). In one case, after the exonerating evidence came to light, the charges were dismissed based on a
government motion for dismissal. In the other case, the Brady evidence came to light mid-trial and essentially
matched the second scenario described above (i.e., I strongly still believed that the defendant was guilty, but I
could also see how the evidence might make the jury doubt a key witness's testimony); the defense attorney
made effective use of the evidence on cross-examination and the jury hung. During that year, however, I
generally did not draw a distinction between "true" and "so-called" Brady, in part because Strickler had not yet
been decided, and in part because the section in which I worked strongly endorsed the turning over of any
evidence of an exculpatory nature. As a matter of course, therefore, I turned over evidence which we might now
term "so-called" Brady evidence but which was not constitutionally compelled. Although beyond the scope of
this essay, my observations during that year strongly confirmed the idea that the norms and expectations of a
prosecutor's office will influence the behavior of its lawyers beyond the strict letter of the law. Cf W. Bradley
Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation ofthe Legal Profession: Social Norms in Professional Communities, 54 VAND. L.
REV. 1955 (2001).
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probability that the outcome would be different. In Agurs, for example, the Court
acknowledged that "there is a significant practical difference between the pre-
trial decision of the prosecutor and the post-trial decision of the judge" but then
advised that "the prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of
disclosure."58
Twenty years later, the Court dispensed similar advice but in stronger
rhetorical terms. In Kyles, the State requested an even higher materiality standard
than the Bagley standard, arguing that it is "'difficult ... to know' from the
'perspective [of the prosecutor at] trial... exactly what might become important
later on."' 59 With a stern lecturing tone, the Court strongly rejected the State's
argument for more "leeway" in deciding whether to disclose evidence:
.... At bottom, what the State fails to realize is that, with or without
more leeway, the prosecution cannot be subject to any disclosure
obligation without at some point having the responsibility to determine
when it must act .... Unless, indeed, the adversary system of
prosecution is to descend to a gladiatorial level unmitigated by any
prosecutorial obligation for the sake of truth the government simply
cannot avoid responsibility for knowing when the suppression of
evidence has come to portend such an effect on a trial's outcome as to
destroy confidence in its result.
This means, naturally, that a prosecutor anxious about tacking too
close to the wind will disclose a favorable piece of evidence .... This is
as it should be. Such disclosure will serve to justify trust in the
prosecutor as "the representative... of a sovereignty ... whose interest ... in
a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall
be done." And it will tend to preserve the criminal trial, as distinct from
the prosecutor's private deliberations, as the chosen forum for ascertaining
the truth about criminal accusations. 60
The Court's solution, therefore, for the prosecutor's difficulties in applying a
result-affecting test,'6 before the result is known has been to cheerlead "the
prudent prosecutor" to disclose evidence and to give a warning scowl to the
prosecutor who would "tack ... too close to the wind.,
62
The Court's holdings and rhetoric thus present a somewhat curious and
conflicted view of Brady's core values. The Court appears to want prosecutors to
view themselves as under an obligation to turn over "so-called" Brady, implying
that on some level it does perceive the turning over of such material as necessary
58. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108.
59. Kvies, 514 U.S. at 438.
60. Id. at 439-40 (citation omitted).
61. United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 143 (2d Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the Brad), disclosure
standard requires "lain assessment ... best made after a trial is concluded.").
62. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 439.
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for ensuring fair trials. At the same time, the Court is unwilling to place a
constitutional imprimatur on the pre-trial disclosure of such evidence because it
does not want to provide a post-trial remedy unless it is convinced that serious
doubts exist as to the defendant's guilt. Brady's inability to gain a firm constitutional
foothold as a pre-trial right, therefore, can in part be attributed to the Court's
concerns with post-conviction relief, resulting in a somewhat odd and circular
spectacle: a pre-trial obligation that is defined through speculation on a post-trial
result, a result which itself ultimately may be influenced by the pre-trial decision
of whether or not to disclose.
IV. THE REALITIES OF BRADY AS A DISCOVERY DEVICE
Once we unmask the realities of how Brady matches up with the ethical
prosecutor's duties, the limits of Brady's pre-trial reach become apparent. While
we all can readily state the materiality test for Brady, it may still have come as
something of a surprise to actually apply the standard in a pre-trial context. I
suspect this surprise results because many lawyers, judges and law professors
still reflexively tend to think of Brady in "so-called" Brady terms rather than in
"true" Brady terms. This tendency is perhaps unintentionally reinforced by the
judiciary's proclivity for speaking of Brady in language such as: "Brady does not
require a prosecutor to divulge every scintilla of evidence that might conceivably
inure to a defendant's benefit. '63 While true, this type of statement also carries
the implication that Brady has a fairly far reach and that the courts must,
therefore, guard against letting its tendrils spread so wide that it is used to reach
"every scintilla of [favorable] evidence." In reality, though, as the Strickler
Court's expression of the distinction reminds us, far from threatening to sweep
every "shred of [favorable] evidence" 64 within Brady's constitutional scope, the
doctrine's pre-trial discovery reach is really quite limited.
Moreover, Brady's doctrinal limitations as a pre-trial discovery mechanism
are magnified by the realities of criminal practice. Close to ninety percent of all
cases on both the federal and state levels are resolved through guilty pleas, and
the Court has indicated that Brady will have little, if any, role to play during plea
bargaining. In United States v. Ruiz, 65 the Court unanimously reversed a Ninth
Circuit case which had held that Brady gave a defendant the right to disclosure of
material impeachment information prior to entering a guilty plea.66 While the
Supreme Court cautiously did not declare that Brady could never apply to a
63. United States v. Reyes, 270 F.3d 1158, 1166 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Lieberman v. Washington, 128
F.3d 1085, 1092 (7th Cir. 1997)).
64. Smith v. Sec'y of N.M. Dep't of Corr., 50 F.3d 801, 823 (10th Cir. 1995).
65. 122 S.Ct. 2450 (2002).
66. Because the Ninth Circuit concluded that Brady applied to plea agreements, it proceeded to find that
the government could not lawfully require defendants to waive their right to Brady information. United States v.
Ruiz, 241 F.3d 1157, 1167-69 (9th Cir. 2001).
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guilty plea,67 the Court also repeatedly emphasized that Brady was a trial-related
right distinct from the decision to plead guilty. 68 Consequently, the fact that nine
out of ten cases are resolved by guilty pleas ensures that Brady plays a minimal
role in triggering prosecutorial disclosure of exculpatory evidence. Indeed, even
in the small percentage of cases that do proceed to trial, the courts have understood
Brady as not requiring disclosure until the trial itself, unless the failure to disclose
earlier rendered the trial unfair. 69
Once Brady's development as a constitutional law doctrine is coupled with
the realities of criminal practice, it should not be surprising that Brady has not
generated a large amount of pre-trial discovery. Assuming the case even proceeds
to trial, it will be-and perhaps ethically should be-a rare case where a
prosecutor will possess evidence that she believes objectively raises serious
questions about the defendant's guilt and yet decides to still pursue a conviction
at trial. The Court, in other words, has defined "true" Brady in such a way that
prosecutors in their daily practice should not be consistently finding such
material in the files of the cases that they are taking to trial.
It is important, therefore, to recognize Brady as less of a discovery mechanism
and as more of a post-trial due process safety check where information surfaces
after trial that exculpatory evidence was suppressed.7° Perhaps Brady's most
important pre-trial function is that it stresses the prosecutor's responsibility for
and the need to be aware of all evidence within the government's possession.7' By
67. The majority expressly noted in its opinion that the plea agreement in issue had obligated the
government to turn over "any information establishing the factual innocence of the defendant" and that the
evidence at issue was impeachment evidence. Ruiz, 122 S.Ct. at 2455-56. One possible inference is that Brady
might apply to guilty pleas if a plea agreement did not contain a rough equivalent to Brady or if the exculpatory
evidence at issue more directly proved the defendant's innocence than impeachment information. Id. at 2457
(Thomas, J., concurring). This possible interpretation led Justice Thomas to write a special concurrence to
clarify his view that Brady is "not implicated at the plea stage regardless." Id. See also Matthew v. Johnson, 201
F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000) (suggesting that Brad), may not apply to guilty pleas).
68. The majority opinion used italics not once but twice in expressing the view that Brady impeachment
material relates to "the fairness of a trial, not ... to whether a plea is voluntary." Ruiz, 122 S.Ct. at 2455. "[T]he
need for this information is more closely related to the fairness of a trial than to the voluntariness of the plea."
Id. at 2457.
69. See BENNETI"L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIALMISCONDUCr§§ 5:13-:15 (2d ed. 2000).
70. Possible Brady violations can surface in a variety of ways, ranging from an ethical prosecutor
learning of a problem and disclosing it, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 413 (1976) (prosecutor revealed
newly discovered evidence "from a belief that 'a prosecuting attorney has a duty to be fair and see that all true
facts, whether helpful to the case or not, should be presented"'), to the defense filing a Freedom of Information
Act request, United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (FOIA request uncovered contracts with government
witness which contradicted pre-trial claims that no "deals, promises or inducements" had been made).
71. See, e.g., Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437. The Court's encouragement of voluntary disclosure coupled with
its expansive view of what is exculpatory offers defense counsel an opportunity to seize the initiative by filing
Brady-Kyles motions specifically requesting evidence that might be exculpatory in their case. Kyles suggests
that defense counsel should think broadly, citing evidence like that at issue in Kyles: evidence calling into
question the credibility of non-witnesses, internal police documents providing the basis for claiming the police
were negligent in their investigation, or evidence comparable to the list of license numbers of the cars in the
crime scene's parking lot. See William S. Geimer, Pretrial Kyles, 1998 Annual Criminal Law Seminar (Virginia
Trial Lawyers Association) (on file with author). While specific requests are encompassed with Bagley's one-
size-fits-all materiality standard, they still are more likely to yield a finding of materiality because they put the
prosecutor on notice that the defendant views the information as potentially exculpatory. Bagley, 473 U.S. at
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making the prosecutor responsible for all of the government's evidence, Brady
provides legal leverage to both courts and prosecutors to ensure that the police or
investigating agencies have fully revealed to the prosecutor both the favorable
and unfavorable evidence that they have collected. Because the evaluation of
evidence as "material" under Brady rests with the prosecutor, she is
constitutionally obligated to ensure that the police and other investigating bodies
are showing her all of the evidence that they have gathered, whether or not the
police believe the evidence to be materially exculpatory. In this sense, Brady
does enhance pre-trial discovery by making the police subject to a due process
obligation to provide all evidence and information to the prosecutor so that she in
turn can fulfill her constitutional obligations. 2
Otherwise, Brady's primary impact on pre-trial discovery would seem to be
the sub-constitutional effect of encouraging prosecutors to turn over "so-called"
Brady evidence. From this perspective, while declining to give constitutional
status to the ABA standards for prosecutorial disclosure, Brady can be seen as
helping to foster an atmosphere consistent with their compliance. To the extent
that this sub-constitutional side effect exists, it is laudatory, and at least one
survey indicates that prosecutors often do voluntarily fill the void left by formal
discovery obligations 3
What cannot be known without further study, of course, is whether prosecutors
are turning over "so-called" Brady material with the same frequency that they
would if they were under a formal constitutional obligation. Certainly the most
significant difference is that a prosecutor who declines to disclose "so-called"
Brady material knows that the defendant will not have a remedy, even if the non-
74
compliance constitutes a serious ethical violation . While many prosecutors are
likely to turn over "so-called" Brady to be on the safe side and out of a sense of
ethical obligation, cases like Strickler v. Greene send the message that even
powerful exculpatory evidence is unlikely to cause the prosecutor to run afoul of
Brady. In Strickler, the majority went so far as to say that "[t]he District Court
[which had found a Brady violation based on 'potentially devastating
682-83.
72. See generally Robert Hochman, Brady v. Maryland and the Search for Truth in Criminal Trials, 63
U. CHI. L. REV. 1673, 1700-05 (1996).
73. See, e.g., Win. Bradford Middlekauff, What Practitioners Say About Broad Criminal Discovery
Practice, CRIM. JUST., Spring 1994, 14, 55 (stating that seventy-six percent of responding Assistant U.S.
Attorneys in a 1984 ABA survey stated that they provide extensive discovery beyond what is required by the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and forty-two percent adopt an open-file policy). See also Laurie L.
Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors, 26 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 553, 562-63 (1999) (establishing how prosecutors have ethical obligations to fill in the "gaps" in areas
such as discovery).
74. Unless state law provides for a new trial where failure to disclose falls shy of a Brad), due process
violation, the defendant will not be entitled to a new trial at which he can use the exculpatory evidence. Even
the chances of a disciplinary proceeding against the prosecutor for violating the ethics rules are slim. One
commentator found that "disciplinary charges have been brought infrequently and meaningful sanctions rarely
applied" against prosecutors for violating the ethical rules governing discovery. Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary
Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 697 (1987).
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impeachment material' that had not been disclosed] was surely correct that there
is a reasonable possibility that either a total, or just a substantial, discount of the
[eyewitness's] testimony might have produced a different result, either at the
guilt or sentencing phases," but proceeded to deny relief because the evidence
did not establish "a reasonable probability of a different result.,
75
If Brady is simply a tool for appellate courts to double-check the guilt of the
defendant where suppressed evidence comes to light after conviction, then the
Court's fashioning of Brady seems appropriate and any turning over of "so-
called" Brady evidence is merely ethical icing on the due process cake. But this,
of course, brings us back to the original point of the essay: making transparent
that Brady is not a discovery doctrine but instead a means of remedying police
and prosecutorial misconduct or, in certain cases, unintentional but highly
prejudicial non-disclosures. And we also should not forget that an alternative
view of the "Brady ideal" was possible: an interpretation that saw Brady as a pre-
trial right aimed at ensuring that a criminal trial is a full adversarial airing of
evidence before the jury.
V. FINAL THOUGHTS ON BRADY AND DISCOVERY
When the Court was first crafting the materiality standard, Justice Marshall
expressed a view that very well might have led Brady to assume more of a
superhero status when it came to pre-trial discovery. In Agurs, Justice Marshall
first began to voice his view that the Court's materiality standard was frustrating
76Brady's purposes. By the time of Bagley, he had come to believe that a
prosecutor should have to "turn over to the defendant, all information known to
the government that might reasonably be considered favorable to the defendant's
case.""' n He advocated the "reasonably favorable" standard because he believed
that the due process obligation should focus on ensuring that a defendant had all
of the material necessary to effectively mount a defense to the State's use of the
prosecutorial power at trial. In other words, what the Strickler Court termed "so-
75. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 291.
76. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 119 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that the defendant should be entitled to
a new trial if he shows "there is a significant chance that the withheld evidence, developed by skilled counsel,
would have induced a reasonable doubt in the minds of enough jurors to avoid a conviction.").
77. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 695-96 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
78. Once the prosecutor suspects that certain information might have favorable implications for the
defense, either because it is potentially exculpatory or relevant to credibility, I see no reason
why he should not be required to disclose it. After all, favorable evidence indisputably
enhances the truth-seeking process at trial. And it is the job of the defense, not the prosecution,
to decide whether and in what way to use arguably favorable evidence. In addition, to require
disclosure of all evidence that might reasonably be considered favorable to the defendant
would have the precautionary effect of assuring that no information of potential consequence
is mistakenly overlooked. By requiring full disclosure of favorable evidence in this way,
courts could begin to assure that a possibly dispositive piece of information is not withheld
from the trier of fact by a prosecutor who is torn between the two roles he must play. A clear
rule of this kind, coupled with a presumption in favor of disclosure, also would facilitate the
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called" Brady material would have become "true" Brady under Justice Marshall's
standard, and failure to disclose it would have required reversal unless the
prosecutor could satisfy the harmless error standard of Chapman v. California.79
The "reasonably favorable" standard, therefore, almost certainly would have
led Brady to play a far greater role as an avenue of pre-trial discovery, in part
because it adopts a forward-looking pre-trial perspective instead of using the
current post-conviction reversal standard. Rather than requiring the prosecutor to
step into the shoes of a hypothetical juror and speculate whether the evidence
would cause a juror to have a reasonable doubt in a yet-to-be-heard case,
Marshall's standard would have placed the prosecutor in the far more familiar
role of a lawyer and asked a far easier question: can I see how, if I were the
defense attorney, I would be able to use this information to advance my client's
argument for acquittal? Like all lawyers, prosecutors are trained to look at how
evidence can be used to poke holes in their case so that they can anticipate how
to respond to any weaknesses. By asking the prosecutor to engage in this familiar
exercise as the means of fulfilling her Brady duties, the "reasonably favorable"
query would thus have presented a standard that would have been far easier for
the prosecutor to apply prior to trial. s°
Such an inquiry would also relieve the ethical tension that this essay has
argued underlies the Bagley standard. As we have seen, Bagley requires the
prosecutor to achieve a state of cognitive separation where she can
simultaneously recognize that a piece (or pieces) of evidence objectively can
create a reasonable doubt for the jury while still believing that the case warrants
prosecution. The "reasonably favorable" standard, by contrast, would not require
the prosecutor to obtain this Zen-like state of simultaneously harmonizing
objective and subjective beliefs, but only would require that she understand how
the evidence could be viewed by the defense as helpful to her case; in other
words, under Marshall's standard, Brady would be triggered far before a
prosecutor would have to engage in any serious ethical questioning of whether
she should still be pursuing the case because the exculpatory evidence exists.
And, as we have seen, part of Justice Marshall's argument for the easier-to-
satisfy "reasonably favorable" standard was his belief that the psychological
realities of a prosecutor's practice would render it difficult for a prosecutor to
engage in the cognitive separation that the Bagley standard now asks of
prosecutors.
prosecutor's admittedly difficult task by removing a substantial amount of unguided discretion.
Id. at 698.
79. Id. at 704 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)). Chapman would require "revers[al]
unless it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the withheld evidence would not have affected the outcome of
the trial." Id. Justice Marshall acknowledged the criticism that the harmless error standard could be applied so
as to make little practical difference, but he believed that by making clear that the duty to disclose extended to
"all" favorable evidence and not just "some," his standard would engender greater disclosure. Id. at 705.
80. Justice Marshall argued that this standard acknowledged that "InJo prosecutor can know prior to trial
whether such evidence will be of consequence at trial; the mere fact that it might be, however, suffices to
mandate disclosure." Id. at 702-03.
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Whether the "reasonably favorable" standard ultimately would have been a
wise constitutional rule is open to debate on a variety of constitutional and policy
grounds." In a number of constitutional areas, not just with Brady, the Supreme
Court deliberately has "underenforce[d]" constitutional rights because of
institutional concerns. " Beyond debate, however, is the conclusion that Justice
Marshall's approach would have brought Brady far closer to superhero status in
the discovery context.
Brady remains an important constitutional doctrine and, indeed, a constitutional
superhero, in certain contexts: the doctrine can ensure that a defendant has a post-
conviction remedy if police or prosecutorial misconduct is uncovered,83 even if
the suppression was inadvertent.4 Nor can one downplay the importance of
Brady's moral message to every government actor that they are responsible not
only for collecting evidence of guilt, but also for being vigilant as to the
existence of exonerating evidence. As this essay has attempted to highlight,
however, it also is important to keep in mind that when it comes to debating
whether defendants have adequate access to discovery prior to trial, Brady's
superhero credentials are distinctly human.
81. Canada's experience with prosecutorial discovery offers an interesting counter-example to the
United States Supreme Court's chosen route. Canada adheres to a standard of disclosure more closely attune to
Justice Marshall's approach, requiring "disclosure of all relevant information" with relevance being defined as
having a reasonable probability that it will be useful to the accused; no distinction, however, is made between
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. See Regina v. Stinchcombe [1991] S.C.R. 326. For a defense of the
United States Supreme Court's "reasonable probability" standard, see Corinne M. Nastro, Strickler v. Greene:
Preventing Injustice By Preserving the Coherent 'Reasonable Probability' Standard to Resolve Issues of
Prejudice in Brady Violation Cases, 60 MD. L. REV. 373 (2001).
82. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation
After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 467 (2000); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal
Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1218 (1978).
83. See, e.g., In re an Investigation of W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d 501
(W. Va. 1993) (relying on Brady to provide system-wide relief where crime lab investigator engaged in
widespread misconduct that was not discovered until after numerous trials).
84. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
